Apuleius and the concept of a philosophical rhetoric by O'Brien, Maeve
  
Apuleius and the Concept of a Philosophical Rhetoric
Author(s): Maeve O'Brien
Source: Hermathena, No. 151 (Winter 1991), pp. 39-50
Published by: Trinity College Dublin
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23040967
Accessed: 07-05-2020 11:47 UTC
 
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Trinity College Dublin is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Hermathena
This content downloaded from 78.16.160.210 on Thu, 07 May 2020 11:47:39 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Apuleius and the Concept of a
 Philosophical Rhetoric
 by Maeve O'Brien
 There is a remarkable saying of a wise man concerning the pleasures of
 the table, to the effect that 'The first glass quenches thirst, the second
 makes merry, the third kindles desire, the fourth madness' (Florida 20.1).
 These are the opening words of Florida 20.' The Florida is a collection
 of extracts of epideictic or show oratory delivered by Apuleius to
 audiences in Carthage. Apuleius was a native of north Africa and
 is speaking, confident of a respectful response on home ground. He
 lived during the Second Sophistic, an era characterized by a revival
 of the interests of the sophists of the fifth century B.C. In the
 second century A.D., Apuleius' time, an exaggerated, even mystical,
 reverence was attached to rhetoric and philosophy, as, for example
 may be seen in Apuleius' life of Plato, which is the oldest that has
 come down to us, where Apuleius claims descent from Poseidon for
 Plato (De Plat. I. 1-4. 180-189).2 Apuleius (Apology 37) provides an
 illustration of his remarkable view of language. He recounts how
 Sophocles defended himself on a charge of madness by simply
 reciting Oedips at Colonus in full. The judges were won over by the
 shrewdness of his argument and the eloquence of his language. The
 power of the language of Oedipus at Colonus forms Sophocles' only
 defence. Apuleius is not only concerned with language as an orna
 ment, but also with language as embodying some kind of mystical
 significance.3 In the extract quoted above Apuleius compares the
 first cup to the first draught of philosophy, the Muses' wine, which
 teaches the rudiments of literature. The second corresponds to the
 teaching of the grammaticus, and the third arms one with the elo
 quence of the rhetor. Thus far most people drink. But Apuleius
 claims that he drank from the fourth cup and many others, which
 can lead to health rather than to madness. From these he imbibed
 the inspiration of the Muses in poetry, knowledge of geometry,
 music, dialectic and philosophy. All the best philosophers whom
 Apuleius attempts to emulate, were poets also:
 For Empedocles composed verse, Plato dialogues, Socrates hymns, Epi
 charmus music, Xenophon histories, and Crates satire. But your friend
 Apuleius cultivates all these branches of art together and worships all nine
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 Muses with equal zeal. His enthusiasm is, I admit, in advance of his
 capacity . . . (Florida 20. 5-6).4
 This is a good example of Apuleius' virtuoso approach in these
 speeches. Despite this approach, or perhaps because of it, it is
 notable that Apuleius' special interests are philosophy and rhetoric,
 which were common preoccupations of the time.5 Not only is he a
 self-styled philosopher, he is also a veritable Hippias, and by
 extension of the metaphor, a Daedalus, in respect of his writings.6
 On the other hand, philosophy has taught him not only to love
 those who have been fair to him, but also those who have not, and
 to attach greater importance to justice than to his own private
 interests and to prefer the furtherance of the public welfare to the
 service of his own.7
 Apuleius wishes that philosophy could issue a prohibition against
 base imitations of itself, just as Alexander the Great is said to have
 done in regard to his own portrait:8
 And would that philosophy could issue a like proclamation, that should
 have equal weight, forbidding unauthorized persons to reproduce her
 likeness; then the study and contemplation of wisdom in all her aspects
 would be in the hands of a few good craftsmen who had been carefully
 trained, and unlettered fellows of base life and little learning would ape
 the philosopher no longer (though their imitation does not go beyond the
 professor's gown), and the queen of all studies, whose aim is no less
 excellence of speech than excellence of life, would no longer be profaned
 by evil speech and evil living: and, mark you, profanation of either is far
 from hard (Florida 7. 9-11).9
 This extract shows that Apuleius places rhetoric and philosophy on
 the same footing, and that he envisages two levels of rhetoric. Does
 Apuleius combine both his interests and posit the existence of a
 philosophical rhetoric? If he does, he does so in an idiosyncratic
 and non-systematic way. Nevertheless, it is useful to see how he
 defends rhetoric. I am limiting myself to one main text, De Platone
 et eius Dogmate or On Plato and his Doctrine, obviously because of its
 subject-matter and because its authorship is certain, noting that
 mention of rhetoric is missing from its Greek 'companion piece' by
 Albinus/Alcinous.10
 The notion of a philosophical rhetoric was not new. The mode
 of living which Isocrates' philosophy recommended depended on
 the art of speaking well. Even though Plato maintains that flattery
 invades all types of rhetoric (Gorgias 464-5), he still holds that a
 higher rhetoric complements dialectic as in the Phaedrus (especially
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 267a) where Socrates describes a word living and in the soul which
 Apuleius may have had in mind when proposing the discipline of
 contemplating good, his term for philosophical rhetoric." Among
 the Romans, Cicero was attracted to the Academic philosophy
 because of his conviction that this school admitted of both phil
 osophy and rhetoric in a complementary relationship.12
 Apuleius' philosophical system is similar to those of the other
 Middle Platonists of his era. General features of such Platonism
 include an idiosyncratic mixture of elements from other philo
 sophies, the idea of assimilation to a god, the notion of the Ideas
 as thoughts in the mind of a God, and an elaborate system of
 daemons.13
 Apuleius' philosophical background is well described by J. Beau
 jeu who is sure that the masters of Albinus and Apuleius inherited
 the 'dogmatic' tradition reestablished by Antiochus of Ascalon and
 enriched after him by his successors with heterogeneous elements
 which more or less disfigured the Ancient Academy and so the
 thought of Plato himself.14
 The importance of a philosophical rhetoric to Apuleius must be
 viewed in the context of his Platonism. He reports in On Plato and
 his Doctrine (hereafter De Platone) that there are two substances or
 essences in which all things are created, including the world itself
 (De Platone I. 6. 193). The one essence we can see, the other is
 visible to the eyes of the mind only:
 Of the primary essence or substance is the creator and the creative mind
 and the Forms of things and the soul; of the secondary substance are all
 things which are made or born (and which take their source from the
 model of the higher substance), which can be changed or transformed and
 which are like rivers everflowing onwards in flight. Still now, since that
 substance of true perception, about which I have spoken, supports itself
 with firm strength, even the words which discuss it are full of steady
 reasoning and credibility. But the reasoning and words which discuss that
 substance which is, as it were, a shadow and image of the higher one, exist
 merely as inconsistent science (De Plat. 1.6.194). 5
 This notion of two levels of existence each with its own language is
 reinforced some chapters later in a passage Apuleius inserts between
 one on the world soul and another on the nature of time:
 Moreover, the nature of things is twofold, there is both one which he calls
 doxastos, which can be seen by the eye and touched by the hand, and also
 the second which comes into the soul and is meditative and intelligible —
 I beg your pardon for the newness of the wording here, which must needs
 41
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 be, due to the difficulties inherent in the subject-matter. At any rate, the
 former part is mutable and readily visible to someone just looking. The
 latter, however, which is seen by the gaze of the soul only, and is grasped
 and absorbed by piercing reasoning, is immutable, constant and always
 the same. Accordingly, he says that there is a twofold account and
 exposition for each one: visible nature is cobbled together and made sense
 of by fortuitous conjecture, but the intelligible is proven to exist by an
 eternal and constant account (De Plat. 1.9.200).16
 It is evident from these passages in Book I that there are two kinds
 of language. In Book II of De Platone Apuleius says that the higher
 language is pursued by the outstanding person, and is full of steady
 reasoning and credibility. The other language has to do with the
 inconsistent discipline of the secondary essence, study of which is
 pursued by one who is less good. Apuleius explains these two classes
 of people:
 An example of the one is of the divine, tranquil and blessed, and of the
 other the impious, barbarous and deservedly dishonoured; so that he who
 is averse and a stranger to the proper mode of life wishes to be quite like
 the worst; on the other hand, a good person wishes to be more like the
 divine in so far as he is able (De Plat II.8.230).17
 In the subsequent discussion on rhetoric, Apuleius assigns two
 different kinds of rhetoric to each person. In doing so, he adheres
 to his statement that there are two essences, one higher and one
 lower, or two natures of things, one seen by the soul, the other by
 the eyes, because the first language is a discipline which con
 templates the good, and is akin to philosophy, and the other is a
 science which captivates by semblances:
 Hence, there are two rhetorics for each one, one is the discipline of
 contemplating good, which adheres to justice and is suitable and proper
 to the mode of life of one who wishes to seem concerned, a politicus, the
 other is a science of flattery captivating by verisimilitude, a hotch-potch
 using no rational system — thus, we are accustomed to call it an enter
 tainment which desires persuasion because it cannot teach (De Plat.
 II.8.231).18
 The "discipline of contemplating good" is obviously the rhetoric
 "full of steady reasoning and credibility" or the "eternal and
 constant account" which Apuleius says describes the primary
 essence, that is the soul, the Forms of things and the intelligible
 world. This rhetoric corresponds to Plato's dialectic:
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 and so with dialectic, when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute
 by the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and
 perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the
 absolute good, he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world,
 as in the case of sight at the end of the visible {Rep. VII532).
 Apuleius' definition of rhetoric is perhaps disingenuous, reflecting
 as it does a sophist's attempt to elevate rhetoric to the status of
 philosophy.19 The lower rhetoric, which one must assume is soph
 istry, is but an image of the higher one, and describes what may be
 seen and touched. It is captivating, full of conjecture and incon
 sistent, and describes things such as itself. It is, in fact, rather
 similar to the rhetoric Apuleius uses himself in the Florida or The
 Golden ^4^, for example. Apuleius does not explain or give examples
 of where each rhetoric is used beyond the bald assertion that one
 describes what is visible to the eye, the other that which is visible
 to the mind's eye. This can be ascribed to the structure of the De
 Platone which purports to be a brief summary of all Plato's teachings.
 If Apuleius, as a sophist, wishes to rehabilitate rhetoric he has a
 difficult task ahead of him. Yet Apuleius' views did have some basis
 in the Phaedrus, a work with which Apuleius was familiar.20 It is
 maintained in the Phaedrus that the function of speech is to influence
 the soul (Phaedr. 271a). One is a true rhetor if one knows when to
 speak and when to be silent.21
 The spoken word is superior to the written especially when the
 spoken word is joined to dialectic (Phaedr. 276-7). Lucidity and
 finality and serious importance are to be found only in words spoken
 by way of instruction, or in reality, written on the soul of the hearer
 to enable him to learn about the right, the beautiful and the good
 {Phaedr. 278a). Similarly, elsewhere, that which is apprehensible by
 thought with a rational account (noesei meta logon), is said to be the
 thing that is always unchangeably real; but that which is the object
 of belief together with unreasoning sensation is the thing that
 becomes and passes away, and never has real being (Tim. 28a). Any
 account of the real is similarly abiding and stable, but any account
 of becoming can only be, at best, likely, since it is merely a copy of
 a likeness (Tim. 29b-c). But even when attained, knowledge of the
 former kind (which could be about the ineffable god, for example),
 is then impossible to transmit to others: "The maker and father of
 this universe it is a hard task to find (ergon), and having found him
 it would be impossible (adynaton) to declare him to all mankind."22
 Even Plato was not able to pass on his learning, so how can I,
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 says Apuleius, teach my understanding of this supreme knowledge
 to others:
 when even Plato, endowed with heavenly eloquence, who discoursed on
 equal terms with the immortal gods, will often say that this god of
 incredible majesty and ineffability cannot be comprehended due to a
 deficiency in human discourse. This power is scarcely granted to phil
 osophers even when they have divorced themselves from the body as much
 as possible because of the strength of their minds. Indeed, even for these,
 knowledge of this god is at best intermittent, just as in deepest shade a
 dazzling light gleams with flickering brightness (De Deo Soc. III. 1.124).23
 Apuleius, at any rate, bases his view of rhetoric as the discipline of
 contemplating good on the compound of rhetoric joined with dia
 lectic and on the definition of dialectic found in the Phaedrus and
 the Republic respectively. However these more sympathetic and
 technical views of rhetoric clash with the moralistic notion of
 rhetoric found in the Gorgias.
 Since Apuleius had clearly joined rhetoric to dialectic and in fact
 almost maintained that rhetoric was dialectic, this rhetoric could
 not now be infected with the science of flattery.
 Apuleius was left with the problem of how to deal with this, and
 this he does in the context of his remarks on politics, civilitas. In his
 definition of the two rhetorics {De Plat. II.8.231), the discipline of
 contemplating good, that is the rhetoric full of steady reasoning and
 credibility, is used by one who wishes to appear a politicus, a
 statesman. These are rare birds and the majority fall into the second
 class of citizens who use the science of flattery or lower rhetoric —
 sophistry: "This Plato defined as the power of persuading but not
 of instructing, and he called it the shade, that is the image, of a
 branch of politics" {De Plat. 11.8.231).24 The following are Plato's
 words:
 That [art] which presides over the soul I call politics (politike); to that
 which governs the body I cannot give a single name; yet, since the care
 of the body is a single art, I call its two branches gymnastics (gymnastike)
 and medicine (iatrike). In politics as against gymnastics I place legislation
 (nomothetike) and that which is the counterpart of medicine I call justice
 (dikaiosyne) {Gorg. 464-5).
 Plato avers that certain arts are of use to the body and others benefit
 the soul. There are eight arts in total. The arts concerned with the
 soul are rhetoric, sophistic, justice and legislation; those occupied
 with the body are cookery, cosmetics, medicine and gymnastics.
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 Medicine, gymnastics, legislation and justice are the true arts, that
 is, they have the real good of body and soul constantly in view.
 Plato then says that the art offlattery invades all four of legislation,
 justice, gymnastics and medicine in the forms of sophistry (soph
 istike), rhetoric (rhetorike), cosmetics (kommotike) and cookery (opso
 poiike) (Gorg. 465b-c).
 Therefore, sophistic is represented as being the counterfeit of
 legislation. The latter is defined as the duty of every true statesman,
 namely, to aid the growth and development of the body politic.
 Sophistic is a system of vain and empty rules that merely attempts
 (but does not succeed) to sustain this very growth and development.
 Rhetoric, pretending to right wrongs in individual cases, is, in this
 capacity, the empty shade of justice. Accordingly, "as make-up is
 to gymnastics, so is sophistic to legislation; and as cookery to
 medicine so is rhetoric to justice" {Gorg. 465). Apuleius too defines
 politics as the art proper to the soul:
 This virtue is likewise of use to the soul in two ways: one legislative, the
 other judicial. The former method is similar to exercise through which
 beauty and strength of the soul is acquired, just as the health and poise
 of the body is retained by exercise. The juridical method corresponds to
 medicine, for it cures the diseases of the soul just as the latter does diseases
 of the body. These he calls disciplines (technai) and he declares that care
 of them is generally very profitable. The imitators of these are cookery
 and cosmetics and the sophistic art and the craft of law (professio iuris),
 the charming blandishments of flatterers, disgraceful to those who profit
 by them and useless to all (De Plat. 11.9.232-3).25
 In this, Apuleius' version of the famous Gorgias passage, Apuleius
 substitutes "craft of law" for rhetoric and changes the role assigned
 by Plato to sophistic.
 In the Gorgias sophistic imitates legislation not judicial power,
 and rhetoric imitates judicial power, but in Apuleius, the craft of
 law which replaces rhetoric imitates legislation. Therefore, Apuleius
 takes what he would see as the higher rhetoric out of the number
 of imitators of legislation and justice, and so maintains the import
 ance of the higher rhetoric he has described (De Plat. II.8.231). The
 sophistic art is linked to what he calls the juridical method and
 cookery, and the craft of law mimicks legislation and cosmetics:
 Concerning these, he [Plato] joins sophistry to cooking, for just as in that
 business of medicine, it captures betimes the thought of foolish people just
 as medicine does when it seems to find remedies for diseases; thus the
 sophistic art, imitating the juridical stance, gives an opinion to the foolish
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 just as if it were a dedicated follower of justice to such an extent that it
 favours injustice. And so the craft of law imitates cosmetics, for just as the
 latter wishes to act as a remedy through which the appearance of the body
 and the health is preserved, not only is it of less use to the body, but it
 even breaks health and strength and changes the true colour of the
 complexion to a florid hue; thus the former, mimicking a knowledge of
 law, even pretends that it is a virtue to add to souls, but, however, it only
 weakens that spark of innate diligence which is already there (De Plat.
 II.9.234).26
 Accordingly, a debased version of the legislative method is the
 pernicious evil of the craft of law, a cosmetic which merely mimicks
 true knowledge of law.
 In Plato the debased version of legislation is sophistry. Therefore,
 in a comparison between Apuleius and Plato, the latter's sophistry
 corresponds to Apuleius' craft of law. In Apuleius, the debased
 version of the juridical method is sophistic art, and in Plato the
 debased version ofjustice is rhetoric. Apuleius changes the scheme,
 thinking obviously, with Quintilian, that it is rhetoric as sophistic
 art, a debased rhetoric, that Plato means by rhetoric in this context
 (Quintilian, I.O., 2.15.28).27 He rearranges the substance of Gorgias
 464 to suit his own scheme. He makes three changes. The craft
 of law, not sophistry, imitates legislation. Sophistry imitates not
 legislation but the juridical method. Most importantly, Apuleius
 leaves out rhetoric as such, and saves it for describing the superior
 essence of existence. He maintains the importance of his higher
 rhetoric by this subtle rearrangement, since rhetoric now approxi
 mates dialectic and as such is left out of the scheme, just as dialectic
 is in Plato. This is indeed a sophist's special plea for the primacy
 of rhetoric.
 One must return to the Florida for a practical and populist
 illustration of this theory.28 In Florida 18 Apuleius divines that his
 audience, despite their bookish and philsophical interests, wish
 to hear stories. The stories of Protagoras and Thales illustrate
 complicated points of rhetoric which are the rewards of sophistry,
 and the prizes of practical and theoretical knowledge won by the
 philosopher respectively. The example of Protagoras is as follows.
 Apuleius' description of him emphasizes his rhetorical skill:
 Protagoras was a sophist with knowledge on an extraordinary number of
 subjects, and one of the most eloquent among the first inventors of the art
 of rhetoric. He was a fellow citizen and contemporary of Democritus, and
 it was from Democritus that he derived his learning (Florida 18.19).
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 Protagoras pledges rashly that his pupil Euathlus should pay tuition
 fees to his teacher after Euathlus wins his first case. Euathlus learns
 all the tricks of the trade, but when he completes his studies he
 displays great reluctance to plead any case and to pay his fees.
 Protagoras takes him to court on a charge of non-payment of fees.
 Protagoras argues: if you lose, Euathlus, you will have to pay your
 fees because you will be condemned to do so. If you win, you
 will still have to pay under the terms of your contract. Euathlus,
 perfectissimus discipulus, replies: if I win I am acquitted by the court.
 If I lose I will not have to pay you, Protagoras, because I will have
 lost my first case. Apuleius concludes:
 What think you? Does not the opposition of these sophistic arguments
 remind you of brambles, that the wind has entangled one with another?
 They cling together; thorns of equal length on either side, each penetrating
 to an equal depth, each dealing wound for wound (Florida 18.20).
 Therefore, says Apuleius, the reward of Protagoras must be left to
 the shrewd and avaricious. The reward Thales receives is far better.
 Thales is described as one of the Seven Sages, philosopher, inventor,
 investigator and observer. Mandraytus of Priene promises, in reply
 to Thales' request, that he will always honour Thales as the founder
 of the knowledge he learned from him. Apuleius concludes: "In
 truth, that was a noble recompense, worthy of so great a man and
 beyond the reach of time" (Florida 18.35). Once again, Apuleius
 emphasizes, on the one hand, the changeable nature of sophistry
 and how it captivates by semblances, and on the other hand, the
 fixed and constant nature of his philosophical rhetoric, the discipline
 which contemplates good, so difficult to study that even Plato failed
 to achieve perfection in it.
 Apuleius, who styles himselfphilosophus platonicus, is equally rhetor
 platonicus, and he himself would have seen no conflict between the
 two terms. If one could ask Apuleius, as the tyrant asks Aristippus,
 what profit he had received from the devoted study of philosophy,
 he would probably reply with Aristippus: ut cum omnibus hominibus
 secure et intrepidefabularer (Fragments 2.106).29
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 Notes
 1. All Greek and Latin quotations are translated. The Florida is a collection of extracts of
 dectic oratory by Apuleius. I have used the commentary by J. Beaujeu, Apulee, Apologie,
 Florides (Paris 1971). And in translation, The Apology and Florida of Apuleius of Madaura,
 translated by H. E. Butler (Oxford 1909; reprint, Connecticut 1970). I have translated
 quotations from On Plato and his Doctrine (De Platone et eius Dogmate) and all citations from it
 in this article use the notation of J. Beaujeu, Apulee, Opuscules Philosophiques et Fragments (Paris
 1973). Cf. D. Londry and C.Johanson, The Logic of Apuleius (Brill 1987) 10, where the authors
 maintain that Apuleius is referring to steps in his own education here.
 2. Plato is Apuleius' hero (De Plat. II. 7.229) who has equalled the power of the gods (De
 Plat. 1.2.183), with his heavenly eloquence, On the Daemon of Socrates 3 (De Deo Socratis), cf.
 Apology 65 (Apologia De Magia). Plato is his magister vitae, cf. De Plat. 1.4.189, on Plato's
 philosophy as one which leads one to the utilitas of living and learning and the ratio of
 speaking, cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge 1971) 178n.4: "To be a good speaker
 as well as a man of action had been the ambition of a Greek since Homeric times (77.9.443)."
 3. Cf. E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (California 1951) 252, observes the need
 for "quasi-religious dogma" in the second and third centuries, manifest "generally in the
 pathetic reverence for the written word characteristic of Late Roman and Medieval times".
 On the divine origin oflanguage, cf. The Classical World, edited by D. Daiches and A. Thorlby
 (Aldus Books 1972) 56-57. E. H. Gombrich, Studies in the Art of the Renaissance, (Phaidon 1973)
 171-180, explains how the image itself, the actual written word, was deemed magical through
 some magical sympathy supposed to exist between it and the subject it described.
 4. Cf. the "still undifferentiated functions", which Dodds (above n. 3) 146 speaks of in
 relation to Empedocles might apply just as well to the view of Plato and other philosophers
 current in the second century: "Empedocles represents not only a new but a very old type
 of personality, the shaman who combines the still undifferentiated functions of magician and
 naturalist, poet and philosopher, preacher, healer and public counsellor".
 5. Cf. Florida in general and Flor. 9.4f.
 6. Flor. 9.14ff., and he continues. "I infinitely prefer to all these instruments one simple
 pen, with which I may write poems of all kinds, such as may suit the reciter's wand and the
 accompaniment of the lyre . . . histories also on diverse themes, speeches that the eloquent
 and dialogues that philosophers have praised". Apuleius shares with earlier Sophists a
 concern for language: cf. R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship (Oxford 1968) 37: "The
 main point of words for the Sophist is this: 'the investigation of words is the beginning of
 education'". Apuleius believes, in common with the earlier Pythagoreans, that language is
 holy in the sense that it can approach a higher truth. Cf. B. L. Hijmans 'Apuleius: Philosophus
 Platonicus", A.N.R.W. 11.36.1, p. 461f. This mixture of minute scholarship and mysticism is
 characteristic of Apuleius. Cf. J. Tatum, Apuleius and The Golden ylxr (Cornel! 1978) 127. Cf.
 Horace, Sat. II, 1.39-46.
 7. Flor. 9.33.
 8. Cf. Plato, Rep. V472, on the nature of absolute justice and the metaphor of the painter
 used there; also Rep. X, on the good carpenter who makes a bed, and the artist, who is bad,
 because he merely makes a copy of the bed in a picture. Cf. Tim. 30c.
 9. Many who wish to learn and live by such a philosophy can be deceived by charlatans.
 Apuleius commends the Cynics Diogenes and Antisthenes (Apol. 22). He praises Crates for
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 living a frugal life (Flor. 14 and 22). However, a philosopher such as Crates can be easily
 and insincerely imitated. Accordingly, students of philosophy can be deceived by false and
 petty resemblances: Flor. 9.9. Cf. Plato, Phaedrus, 273e-274a.
 10. The first two books of De Platone are considered to be definitely by Apuleius cf. Beaujeu
 (above n. 1), Introd. p. ix if. There is some dispute about the third entitled On Interpretation
 or Peri Hermeneias, cf. M. W. Sullivan, Apuleian Logic: The Nature, Sources and Influences of
 Apuleius' Peri Hermeneias (Holland 1967) Appendix I p. 235f. For a summary of Meiss's
 arguments on the authenticity of On Interpretation, cf. M. Londry and C. Johanson (above n.
 1) llf. Also J. M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London 1977) 333.
 11. De Plat. II.8.231.
 12. On Cicero and the Academic philosophy, cf. The Question of Eclecticism, edited by J. M.
 Dillon and A. A. Long (California 1988) 34f. Also, Cicero, De Fato, II.3; Tusc. Disp. I iii 6
 and iv 4; Par. Stoic., Proem 2 and 3; De Off. I 3; De Nat. Deor. 11.59.148, on speech as queen
 of all the arts, cf. ibid., III.31.77f. Also Quintilian, I.O. I Pr. 13f; ibid., 11.16.15 and also
 11.21.13; on the ideal orator, ibid., XII.1.25 and 2.8, and compare Apul., De Plat. II.6.228,
 where both recommend that the ideal orator should have practical wisdom, prudentia, and
 theoretical knowledge, sapientia, that is, knowledge of things human and divine.
 13. Cf. Dillon (above n. 10) 307; Hijmans (above n. 6) 467.
 14. Cf. Beaujeu (above n. 1) 57. The opposite view, namely that Neoplatonism resembles
 Platonism, is found in P. Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism, (The Hague 1953) 2.
 15. On two substances cf. Plato, Tim. 37b-c; Phaedo, 65 and 78ff.; ibid., 90c.
 16. Doxastos: cf. F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, The Timaeus of Plato (London 1937) on
 Tim. 29b and notes ad loc. and from there to Tim. 51e.
 17. Cf. Plato, Rep. VI 484ff on true and false philosophers and the best citizen.
 18. Cf. Plato, Rep. VII 53Id and Phaedrus 277-278 on dialectic; and on sophistry, Gorg.
 464-5 and Phaedrus 269 where it is said that the first steps to the true art of rhetoric are taught
 by the Sophists — who then claim these steps are the true art. Cf. Phaedo, 89c-91c against
 misology.
 19. Dillon (above n. 10) 333.
 20. Cf. De Deo Socratis, 19; Apol. 64; The Golden Ass, I. 19.
 21. Apuleius professes to follow the doctrines of Socrates, Pythagoras and Plato (De Deo
 Soc. 23), between whose doctrines he sees no conflict. He says that he learned when to speak
 and when to be silent from the Platonic philosophy which, he maintains, was influenced by
 Pythagoras in this respect (Flor. 15.26).
 22. But when attained this knowledge (which could be about the ineffable God, for
 example), is then impossible to transmit to others: Plato Tim. 28c; cf. De Plat. 1.5.190, cf.
 The Golden Ass XI.23. See R. Mortley, "The Fundamentals of the Via Negativa" AJP 103
 (1982) 433: "it is clear that the rather airy use of the alpha privatives in this period suggests
 little more than a new awe of the transcendent". Cf. the later Platonist, Plotinus, Enn. V.3.14,
 where even the attainment of knowledge, not to mind passing it on to others, is now seen as
 impossible. It is interesting to note how much closer to Plato Apuleius is in this respect.
 23. Cf. Seventh Letter 341c; Plato, Rep. VI, 508c-d.
 24. Cf. Gorg. 463d: "Rhetoric in my account is a reflection of a branch of politics", and
 ibid., 454e which is inaccurately quoted by Apuleius.
 25. Disciplines I disciplinae/technai: Gorg. 464b.
 26. Professio iuris "craft/crafting of law", a rare expression, is substituted for rhetoric in
 Apuleius' scheme. Apuleius may have been thinking of Phaedrus 278e when he coined the
 term. Here, Socrates says the writer or composer of laws who can defend his writings does
 not deserve to be called wise but rather a lover of wisdom: "The man whose most precious
 production is what he has composed or written, and who has devoted his time to twisting
 words this way and that, pasting them together and pulling them apart, may fairly be called
 a poet or a speech writer or a maker of laws (nomographos) ". Nomographos means something
 very like professio iuris; at least it is the same activity, that of law-making, that is being
 described.
 27. According to Quintilian, who reviews Gorg. 464-465, Plato condemns the abuse of
 rhetoric in the politics of his own day, and regards rhetoric in itself as a genuine and
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 honourable thing: "It is clear therefore that Plato does not regard rhetoric as an evil, but
 holds that true rhetoric is impossible for any save a just and good man. In the Phaedrus [261a
 273e] he makes it even clearer that complete attainment of this art is impossible without
 knowledge of justice, an opinion in which I heartily concur ... It was against the class of
 men who employed their glibness of speech for evil purposes that he directed his denunci
 ations" (10 11.15.28).
 28. Flor. 18.29. Cf. Hijmans (above n. 6) 396.
 29. Cf. Beaujeu (above n. 1) 165.
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